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In 2007, the European Court of Human Rights’ Grand Chamber handed down its judgment in DH 
and Others v Czech Republic.  The case arose out of the disproportionately high number of Roma 
children assigned places in segregated schools for children with intellectual disabilities in the Czech 
Republic. It was alleged that this practice discriminated against Roma children who had normal, or 
even above normal, intelligence levels. The applicants claimed that they had been discriminated 
against in the enjoyment of their right to education on account of their race or ethnic origin. The 
Court made a finding of indirect discrimination against the Czech government. Commentators have 
hailed this as a landmark judgment that expands the conception of discrimination under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This paper will discuss how this finding differs from the 
First Chamber’s judgment and other ECHR caselaw to alter the conception of discrimination under 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 





DH and Others v Czech Republic (DH II)2 signified a new era in the conception of 
discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights. 3   The case 
clarified that equality of result is as significant as equality of opportunity;4 and that 
discrimination may occur where evidence of impact of a seemingly neutral measure 
indicates that its result is disparate for different groups, irrespective of whether or 
not that is the intention underpinning the measure.  The Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights5 went further than it had previously in judgments 
concerning discrimination, by finding that a case for discrimination can be made 
where a State fails to treat differently persons in dissimilar situations.  This is a wider 
approach than the traditional conception of discrimination, which was narrowly 
construed to mean treating differently, without objective and reasonable justification, 
                                                        
1 Simone is currently completing her LLM by Coursework at the University of NSW (specialisation in International 
Law), and lives in London where she directs a human rights organisation, René Cassin.  Simone came to René 
Cassin from the New York office of Human Rights Watch (HRW).  Prior to pursuing her passion for human rights, 
Simone was an attorney at leading law firms Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, New York, and Mallesons Stephen 
Jaques, Sydney.  She also worked as a journalist for the Australian Jewish News and as student editor for the 
Australian Journal of Human Rights. Simone holds a BA/LLB and is a graduate of the Centro de Estudio del 
Espanol, Buenos Aires. She has previously lent her skills to JewishCare, the Migrant and Refugee Rights Project, 
Room to Read, the Downing Center Duty Solicitor Scheme and what is now the Aurora Project.   
2 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, Application no. 57325/00, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, 
<http://emiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=825443&portal=hbkm&source=externa
lbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649>. 
3 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Convention.’ 
4 Equality of result is the hallmark of substantive equality, whereas most complaint-based discrimination 
legislation is concerned only with equality of opportunity: Thornton, Margaret “The Liberal Promise: Anti-
Discrimination Legislation in Australia” Oxford University Press. Melbourne. Chapter I ‘The Elusiveness of 
Equality,’ pp. 16-17. 




persons in relevantly similar situations.6  In DH II and subsequent discrimination 
cases, the Court has also been willing to find violations of Article 14 of the 
Convention7 read in conjunction with Article Two of Protocol Number One,8 whereas 
formerly the Court had avoided examination of complaints for violation of Article 14 
in cases where violation of another Convention article was found.9  Other key points 
of differentiation between DH I10 and DH II were the Court’s decision in the latter 
case to: evaluate the applicants as a group rather than on an individual basis; and to 
shift the burden of proof in cases where applicants allege indirect discrimination and 
establish a rebuttable presumption that the effect of a measure or practice is 
discriminatory.11  Furthermore, the Court in DH II took the view that a person cannot 
waive their rights to be free from discrimination of the State, irrespective of any 
alleged act of consent to such a waiver.12  Consequently, the application of the case is 
potentially far-reaching and goes well beyond discrimination on the basis of race 
within the Czech schooling system.  Indeed, although the promise inherent in DH II 
insofar as it pertains to Roma children in the Czech Republic remains unfulfilled,13 
there is great potential for the precedent set by the case to have wider application to 
discrimination on any of the grounds enumerated in the relevant international 
instruments. 
 




The Court’s caselaw on discrimination prior to DH II had not truly addressed the 
concept of substantive equality, or equality of result, as a necessary by-product of 
State’s measures, rather, it was focused on equality of opportunity.  This approach 
was consistent with complaint-based anti-discrimination legislation14 and traditional 
international law.15  DH II finally recognised that the principle of equality will at 
times require States Parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or 
eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination.16  Like the 
dissenting judgment of Judge Cabral Barreto in the First Chamber, the Grand 
Chamber found that Article 14 does not prohibit a Member State from treating 
                                                        
6 This principle was annunciated in Willis v The United Kingdom, Application no. 36042/97, s 48, ECHR 2002-
IV). 
7 Article 14 of the Convention provides that ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.’  The 
Convention is available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/ENG_CONV.pdf >, accessed 12 July 2012. 
8 Article Two of Protocol Number One stipulates that ‘No person shall be denied the right to education.  In the 
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the 
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions.’  See <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/ENG_CONV.pdf >, accessed 12 July 2012. 
9 R. Kushen, ‘Implementing Judgements: Making Court Victories Stick,’ Roma Rights, Number 1, 2010. 
10 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, Application no. 57325/00, ECtHR First Chamber, 7 February 2006, 
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=D.H.%20%7C%20
OTHERS&sessionid=72612210&skin=hudoc-en> accessed 12 July 2012. 
11 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraphs 142 and 204.  
12 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraphs 142 and 204. 
13 Robert Kushen and Lydia Gall, ‘What Happened to the Promise of D.H?,’ Roma Rights, No. 1, 2010, p. 37. 
14 M. Thornton, ‘The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Australia’ in The Elusiveness of 
Equality, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, p. 17. 
15 W. McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law,  Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 264 – 
284. 
16 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18 (37)(1989) (equality and non-discrimination), p. 3. 
ANZJES 4(1) 
  62 
groups differently in order to correct “factual inequalities” between them.  It went on 
to say that in certain circumstances, a failure to attempt to correct inequality through 
different treatment may in itself give rise to a breach of Article 14.  As such, the Court 
was acknowledging that Article 14 covers what Judge Cabral Barreto termed both 
“negative discrimination” and “positive discrimination,”17 and going beyond a one-
dimensional understanding of discrimination as meaning treating differently, 
without objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar 
situations.18 
 
The DH II conception of discrimination is in line with the trend in later UN human 
rights instruments to move away from the more general guarantees of equality and 
non-discrimination towards an increasingly specific and substantive approach to this 
issue.  For instance, the Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination substantively address inequality facing people on the basis 
of gender or race respectively by introducing the notion of special measures to 
address this form of discrimination.19  Similarly, the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRoC) attempt to address discrimination in both a formal and substantive sense.20  
Substantive equality and a widened concept of discrimination are also addressed in 
terms of remedies under the UN instruments.  General Comment 31 clarifies that 




The Court in DH II also stated that discrimination potentially contrary to the 
Convention may result from a de facto situation.22  This decision built on an earlier 
judgment in Thlimmenos v Greece,23 in which the Court had stated that: 
 
The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights 
guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an 
objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose 
situations are significantly different.24 
 
In DH I, the First Chamber Court heard the observations of third-party interveners, 
Human Rights Watch and Interights, who aimed to establish that the testing process 
                                                        
17 Per Cabral Barreto J, D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR First Chamber, 7 February 2006, 
paragraph 6. 
18 This principle was annunciated in Willis v The United Kingdom, Application no. 36042/97, paragraph 48, 
ECHR 2002-IV). 
19 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. An Introduction to the Core Human Rights 
Treaties and the Treaty Bodies. Fact Sheet No. 30, at p. 5.  For example, Article 1(4) states that:  
‘special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups 
or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal 
enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, 
provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for 
different racial groups…’ 
20 Article 12(3) of the CRPD, for instance, substantively addresses discrimination by providing that ‘States Parties 
shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity.’  This is an acknowledgment that sometimes formal equality does not lead to 
equality of result. 
21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR) General comment 31, paragraph 15, p. 4. 
22 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 175 
23 Thlimmenos v. Greece, 6 April 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-IV, pp. 317, paragraph 44. 




for so-called special schools in the Czech Republic was indirectly discriminatory on 
the basis that it failed to treat Roma children differently in light of their specific 
circumstances.  These organisations explained that the notion of indirect 
discrimination covers cases where racially neutral statutory provisions or a general 
policy or measure produces discriminatory or disproportionate results.25   Hugh 
Jordan v the United Kingdom was cited as authority for the proposition that intent 
was not required in cases of indirect discrimination.26  However, the First Chamber 
was unable to find that a case for indirect discrimination had been established, as it 
failed to go beyond inquiring as to the intent underpinning the system in order to 
adequately assess the outcome.  In its view, it more or less sufficed that the special 
schools could not be shown to have been established with any discriminatory 
agenda.27 
 
However, in DH II, the Court reached a different conclusion.  It elaborated on the 
concept of indirect discrimination by considering ECRI General Policy 
Recommendation no. 7 on national legislation to combat racism and racial 
discrimination.  This recommendation defines ‘indirect discrimination’ to mean: 
 
Cases where an apparently neutral factor such as a provision, criterion or 
practice cannot be as easily complied with by, or disadvantages, persons 
belonging to a group designated by a ground such as race, colour, language, 
religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin, unless this factor has an 
objective and reasonable justification.28 
 
The factor would only have an objective and reasonable justification where it pursues 
a legitimate aim and there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be realised.  In the circumstances of DH, the 
Grand Chamber concluded that the schooling system indirectly discriminated against 
Roma children even though it did not appear to at first glance. The basis for the 
finding of indirect discrimination was that the tests were conceived for the majority 
population and did not take Roma specifics such as language and culture into 
consideration.29  Furthermore, the restrictive approach of the tests and their inability 
to factor in Roma specifics could not be seen as fulfilling a legitimate aim.  On the 
contrary, rather than funnelling those children needing special schooling into the 
system, the tests’ created a false market for special schools, as Roma children of 
above average or average intelligence were much more likely than their non Roma 
counterparts to perform poorly in the tests.  This reasoning was buttressed by the 
findings of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention, which noted that 
while special schools were designed for the mentally handicapped, it appeared that 
many Roma children who were not mentally handicapped were placed in them owing 
to real or perceived language and cultural differences between Roma and the 
majority.30  The net effect was that in some so called ‘special schools’ Roma pupils 
                                                        
25 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR First Chamber, 7 February 2006, paragraph 43. 
26 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 162. 
27 ‘D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic,’ <http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/litigation/czechrepublic>, 
accessed 12 July 2o12. The Court also took comfort from the parental consent to place the applicants in special 
schools, and preferred to assess the applicants on an individual basis rather than as a group. 
28 Quoted in D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 60. 
29 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 201. 
30 Ibid., paragraph 41.  
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made up between 80% and 90% of the total number of pupils.31  Such segregation 
was clearly self-perpetuating in that in and of itself it branded Roma children as 
inferior to their mainstream peers.  It also precluded Roma and mainstream children 
from interacting, thereby fuelling negative stereotypes of Roma harboured by the 
settled community.  Moreover, relegating Roma children to academically inferior 
schools decreased their opportunities for future academic or professional success.  
This was clear given that there were no measures in place to provide additional 
education to students who had gone through the special school system to bring them 
to a level where they would be adequately prepared for regular secondary schools.32  
The Court termed this exclusion of Roma children from mainstream society as 
“tracking” and found that the result of a system of indirect discrimination in 
education was the creation of a social construction of failure.33 
 
Since DH II, the Court has issued judgments in cases such as Sampanis and Others v 
Greece, which follow the reasoning of the Court in DH II with respect to indirect 
discrimination.34  In this case, the Court unanimously found that there had been a 
violation of Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article Two of Protocol 
Number One on the basis of a State failure to provide adequate and non-segregated 
schooling for Roma children.  The Court concluded that, in spite of the authorities’ 
stated willingness to educate Roma children, the effective conditions of school 
enrolment for Roma children and their placement in special preparatory classes 
amounted to indirect discrimination against them.35   The Court also stated that 
integration in schools is a fundamental element for integration into society as a 
whole.  In so doing, the Court made clear the link between indirectly discriminatory 
measures and negative outcomes.  Although the enforcement of the Court’s 
judgments in this area has been disappointing,36 the far-reaching nature of the 
judgments in adding meaning to the concept of discrimination and reinforcing the 
need for special measures has been impressive. 
 
Evidence of impact and use of statistics 
 
In DH II, the Court departed from the reasoning of the First Chamber with respect to 
evidence of impact of the allegedly discriminatory measure.  At issue was whether a 
measure can be found to be discriminatory on the basis of evidence of its impact – 
namely, its disproportionately harmful effects on a particular group – rather than on 
the basis of its intention to specifically target that group.37  This issue is inextricably 
connected to that of indirect discrimination, which the Court in DH II noted can be 
difficult to prove without the use of statistical data.  The First Chamber determined 
that the use of statistics was insufficient for the purposes of establishing a 
discriminatory impact.38  This finding was in line with earlier caselaw including Hugh 
                                                        
31 Report submitted by the Czech Republic pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. 
32 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), Report on the Czech Republic, June 2004 
33 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 52. 
34 ECtHR, Sampanis and Others v Greece, Application no. 32526/05, 5 June 2008, 
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=836273&portal=hbkm&source=externa
lbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649>, accessed  12 July 2o12. 
35 D. Panayote, ‘Greece’s Non-Implementation of International (Quasi-)Judicial Decisions on Roma Issues,’ Roma 
Rights, No. 1, 2010, p. 30.  
36 Ibid., p. 36. 
37 Applicants’ submissions, D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR First Chamber, 7 February 2006, 
paragraph 37. 




Jordan v. the United Kingdom39, where the Court had opined that statistics, albeit an 
important tool, could not, in and of themselves, prove that an activity had resulted in 
indirect discrimination. 
 
In DH, the statistics painted a disturbing picture.  Roma comprised 56% of students 
in special schools in Ostrava but only represented 2.26% of the total primary school 
pupils in Ostrava.  1.8% of non-Roma pupils were placed in special schools, whereas 
the proportion of Roma pupils assigned to such schools was 50.3%.  Accordingly, a 
Roma child in Ostrava was 27 times more likely to be placed in a special school than a 
non-Roma child.40  When presented with this evidence, the Court in DH II took a 
different approach to that of the First Chamber and previous judgments.  The Court 
recognised that when a law is facially neutral and discriminatory only in its effect, 
statistics may sometimes serve as the only way to establish the prejudicial impact of 
the law.  Indeed, where statistics are credible, they may constitute prima facie 
evidence of discrimination and have the effect of shifting the burden of proof onto the 
respondent.41  This reasoning has brought the approach of the Court into line with 
that of by the bodies responsible for supervising the United Nations treaties and by 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, as well as Council Directive 
2000/43/EC.42 
 
Reading Article 14 in conjunction with other provisions of the 
Convention 
 
Another point of differentiation between DH I and DH II and subsequent 
discrimination cases such as Oršuš and Others v Croatia43, is that in the latter two 
cases the Court found violations of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction 
with Article Two of Protocol Number One.  However,  
 
The general practice of the Court of avoiding the examination of a complaint 
for violation of the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 in cases 
where a violation of another Convention Article is found works as a brake that 
impedes the protection of minority rights whenever it appears that the 
violation found could be due to the fact that the victim belonged to a minority 
group.44 
 
The adoption of Protocol 12, Article One of which provides for the prohibition 
of discrimination as an independent right, unconnected with other rights 
protected by the Convention, has made the legal protection of minorities more 
effective.45   
However, Kushen and Gall argue that it is important that the Court continues to be 
clear about the link between discriminatory practices and the deprivation of a variety 
of other rights.  As stated in an Amnesty International report, ‘Unlock Their Future’, 
                                                        
39 Hugh Jordan v the United Kingdom, Application no. 24746/94, ECtHR Third Section, 4 May 2001, 
<http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/CaseLaw/hof.nsf/0ad4f5ba6f6a119bc125668f004c455e/7e0193f3af548611c1256a420
0377c18?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,hugh>, accessed 12 July 2012. 
40 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 18. 
41 As discussed below. 
42 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 136. 
43 Oršuš and Others v Croatia, Application no. 15766/03, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 16 March 2010, 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4ba208fc2.pdf>, accessed 12 July 2012. 
44 Kushen and Gall, op. cit., p. 64. 
45 Ibid., p. 64. 
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“systemic violations of the right to education exclude Roma in Slovakia from full 
participation in society and lock them into a cycle of poverty and marginalisation”.46  
Similarly, in Sedjic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina – the first case in which the 
Court found a violation of Article One of Protocol 12 – the link between the 
discriminatory provisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitution and the ensuing 
political marginalisation and compromise on the right to free elections was 
explained.47  One of the key reasons for making clear the link between equality and 
other rights is that this will increase the protection of minorities, and in turn, 
preserve the cultural diversity of value to the whole community.48  As such, DH II was 
significant in that the reasoning points to a growing consensus amongst State Parties 
that discriminatory measures/practices, particularly where they affect minorities, are 
violations that infringe on the attainment of other rights under the Convention. 
 
Evaluating applicants as a group 
 
DH I and several prior judgments of the Court had approached discrimination as an 
infringement of individual rights, rather than those of a group for which the applicant 
constituted a representative.  However, in DH II, the Grand Chamber rightly opined 
that the entire Roma community in the Czech Republic had suffered as a 
consequence of the indirect discrimination taking place in the schooling system, and 
therefore thought it appropriate to deal with the case as a claim being brought on 
behalf of the Roma community.  In taking this approach, the Court recognised that as 
the applicants were part of the broader Roma Community, which had been 
disproportionately affected by the measures in dispute, they clearly would have 
suffered that effect individually.49  This approach differed from that of the First 
Chamber, which insisted that each applicant receive individualized consideration 
based on the unique circumstances surrounding their application.  The First 
Chamber Court thought it was necessary to consider why that particular applicant 
was placed in a special school,50 thereby distinguishing its reasoning from that used 
by the Council of Europe (which had stressed its concern with the plight of Czech 
Gypsies, in the educational sphere, on the whole — not as individual applicants or 
students).  The Grand Chamber’s decision to decline the applicants’ request to 
consider their applications individually further underscored the fact that the Court 
addresses not only specific acts of discrimination but also systemic practices that 







46 ‘Unlock Their Future,’ Amnesty International, EUR 72/004/2010, London, September 2010. 
47 Sedjic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina, (Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06), ECtHR Grand 
Chamber, 22 December 2009, <http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=5116 >, accessed 
12 July 2012. 
48 Chapman v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 27238/95, EctHR Grand Chamber, 18 January 2001, 
paragraphs 93-94, <http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/471>, accessed 12 
July 2012. 
49 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 209. 
50 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR First Chamber, 7 February 2006, paragraph 45. 
51 Kushen and Gall, op.cit., pp. 37 and D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 




Shifting the burden of proof 
 
DH II also broke ground in terms of the Court’s approach to the burden of proof 
issue.  In DH I, the applicants had argued that if they adduced prima facie evidence of 
discrimination, or if, as in the present case, it came from recent reports of 
international organisations, the burden of proof would shift to the respondent 
Government, which had to prove that the difference in treatment was justified.  
Whereas the First Chamber did not agree with this argument, the Grand Chamber 
found that once the applicant has shown a difference in treatment, it was for the 
Government to show that it was justified.52   Consequently, where an applicant 
alleging indirect discrimination establishes a rebuttable presumption that the effect 
of a measure or practice is discriminatory, the burden shifts to the respondent State, 
which must show that the difference in treatment is not discriminatory.53 
 
Although this approach differs from DH I, there is some former case law to support 
the Grand Chamber in its enunciation of this principle.  In Anguelova v Bulgaria, the 
Court had said that, in certain circumstances: “the burden of proof may be regarded 
as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation.”54  
In addition, the Court was able to refer to Article 4.1 of Council Directive 97/80/EC 
on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex.  This provides that: 
 
Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with 
their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider 
themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been 
applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts 
from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect 
discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no 
breach of the principle of equal treatment.55 
 
In the applicants’ submission, an insufficient command of the Czech language; a 
difference in socio-economic status; and/or parental consent would not suffice to 
constitute reasonable and objective justification, 56  and therefore the national 
authorities had not succeeded in furnishing such an explanation.  The applicants 
argued that even if their placements in special schools pursued a legitimate aim (and 
this, they categorically denied), such a measure could under no circumstances be 
considered proportionate to that aim. 57   In the absence of a racially neutral 
explanation for the measures taken by the Czech Republic, it was therefore legitimate 
to conclude that the difference in treatment was based on racial grounds.  The Court’s 
decision to shift the burden of proof in this case has been followed in subsequent 
discrimination caselaw, including the judgment of the Court in Oršuš and Others v 
Croatia.58  This has drastically reduced the burden on applicants in instances where 




52 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, paragraph 177.  
53 Ibid, paragraph 189. 
54 Anguelova v Bulgaria, Application no. 38361/97, s 111, ECHR 2002-IV. 
55 Quoted in D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 82. 
56 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 138. 
57 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR First Chamber, 7 February 2006, paragraph 38. 
58 Oršuš and Others v Croatia, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 16 March 2010. 
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No waiver of prohibition from discrimination 
 
Shrouded in controversy, the issue of parental consent garnered much debate in the 
Grand Chamber’s opinion and divided the First Chamber and the Grand Chamber in 
DH I and DH II.  Although both Chambers took a different view with respect to 
whether or not there had truly been consent by the applicants’ parents in the 
circumstances of the case, the Grand Chamber qualified this discussion with the 
principle that there could be no waiver of the child’s right not to be racially 
discriminated against in education.59  The Court in DH I had placed significant 
emphasis on the fact that the applicants’ parents had provided written consent prior 
to the respondent’s administration of the test, thereby voluntarily relinquishing their 
rights to object to the testing and placement of the applicants in special schools.60  
The applicants bemoaned the reality that their parents lacked the information 
necessary to make a meaningful decision; however, the First Chamber insisted that 
such responsibility lay with the parents and not the Court.  The Grand Chamber 
disagreed.  While parents had ostensibly consented to the school placements, the 
Grand Chamber did not believe that the parents consented voluntarily.  The 
reasoning of the Grand Chamber was that the parents lacked adequate information 
regarding the potential upshots of their consent and often did not realize the 
academically inferior nature of the schools.  Thus, they were offering their consent 
without understanding the myriad of devastating consequences that might arise from 
their decisions.  The consent was therefore not informed.61  Although the State 
informed parents that they could appeal the placement decision, none of the 
applicants exercised that right of appeal.62  In eroding the significance of the consent 
provided by the applicants’ parents, the Grand Chamber looked to numerous credible 
reports including ECRI’s report on the Czech Republic in March 2000, which 
observed that Roma parents often favoured the channelling of Roma children to 
special schools, partly to avoid abuse from non-Roma children in ordinary schools 
and isolation of the child from other neighbourhood Roma children.63  However, the 
Grand Chamber went further than simply finding that consent had not been 
informed.  The Court stated that irrespective of whether consent had been provided, a 
person cannot waive his rights (let alone the rights of someone else) to be free from 
discrimination by the State.  Having the capacity to waive that right would violate 
public policy.  This position marked a significant departure from the reasoning in DH 
I and reflected the Court’s increasing willingness to elevate the importance of the 
prohibition on discrimination, so that it is harder to argue its displacement by factors 






59 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraphs 142 and 204. 
60 For instance, the school permitted the transfer of two of the applicants, one in each direction, following parental 
request.  Likewise, when one special school suggested that a student transfer to an ordinary school, the non-
consent of that student’s parent precluded the transfer. 
61 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 13 November 2007, paragraph 203. 
62 Respondent argued that because applicants had not exhausted the possible domestic remedies, the Grand 
Chamber could not hear this case.  The Grand Chamber, on the other hand, found that the applicants had done all 
they could, irrespective of the fact that they had not absolutely exhausted all domestic remedies. 
63 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Report on the Czech Republic, March 2000, 






Although the caselaw of the Court points in favour of according States Parties the 
greatest possible discretion or margin of appreciation in order to determine how to 
best implement the rights contained in the Convention; DH II clarifies that when 
discrimination results from differences in race or ethnicity, the Court evaluates the 
law with the most vigorous scrutiny due to its especially odious nature.64  Therefore, 
in defining discrimination and assessing solutions, the Court in DH II afforded less 
deference to State authorities than it had in earlier cases.  Previously, the Court had 
encouraged deference to the State in two arenas: defining discrimination and 
evaluating the material circumstances of a person’s situation.  In 2002, for instance, 
the Court offered a narrower understanding of discrimination in its Willis v. the 
United Kingdom opinion.  There, the Court defined discrimination as treating 
similarly situated people in different ways, absent a reasonable and proportional 
justification for such differential treatment.  The Court did not expand upon what, 
exactly, constitutes differential treatment.  Nor, for that matter, did the Court explain 
how States Parties should evaluate a person’s situation.  In DH II, the Court 
addressed both issues, and expanded its previous conception of discrimination to 
include failure of the State to treat differently persons in dissimilar situations.  
Lacking substantial precedent in the field of educational discrimination, the Grand 
Chamber decided to consider the laws that existed in the  broader  international 
community in deciding what a state could do, could not do, or had to do, with regard to 
providing its citizens with opportunities for education.65  
 
In DH I, the respondents had successfully argued that States Parties must be 
accorded a great deal of deference with regard to establishing school systems.  The 
Court had stated that it was not within its scope of enquiry to assess the overall social 
context of the Czech Republic66 or to make decisions regarding the best way to set up 
a school system.  It observed that the best solution to the problem of education would 
not necessarily be one that will be uniform among the States Parties; rather, each 
State will probably find that a different solution is most suitable for its circumstances.  
The Court was therefore willing to defer to the testing and counselling centres 
responsible for administering the placement test, and was also unwilling to 
pronounce on whether States Parties should set up different schools for different 
groups of students, including those with disabilities.  Pointing the to UN Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Grand Chamber differed in its 
approach to the First Chamber, affirming that although it is the responsibility of the 
States Parties to ensure that schools are accessible and available to all students, the 
Court can and should intervene where there is an absence of procedural safeguards in 
place to prevent discrimination.  In the case of the Czech Republic, section 16 of the 
Schools Act 2004 stipulated that special educational needs mean a disability, health 
problems or a social disadvantage.67  This was indirectly discriminatory in that it set 
up a situation whereby Roma children, who were deemed ‘socially disadvantaged,’ 
                                                        
64 Article 14 distinguishes between two types of discrimination carried out on the basis of race or ethnicity.  Direct 
discrimination involves a law that discriminates on its face.  Indirect discrimination, on the other hand, involves 
facially neutral laws that are nonetheless disparate in their impact. 
65 The Grand Chamber considered materials from a variety of renowned establishments, including the UN, 
UNESCO, and the United States Supreme Court. 
66 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, ECtHR First Chamber, 7 February 2006, paragraph 45. 
67 Section 16 of the Schools Act 2004 (Law no. 561/2004). 
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were channelled through an inferior schooling system.68  For this reason, the Grand 
Chamber was unwilling to accord deference to State authorities and instead 
scrutinised the respondent’s schooling system extensively, widening the conception 
of discrimination in the process. 
 
The Grand Chamber also went much further than it had in previous caselaw by 
pegging the respondent with an affirmative duty to make changes in practice to its 
educational system in order to eliminate indirect discrimination.  The Court 
stipulated that in order to accomplish that aim, the respondent would need to change 
its placement test so that it accounted for language and cultural barriers unique to 
Roma.  The Court also demanded that the respondent implement steps to reduce 
language barriers that would inevitably arise once Roma students entered 
mainstream schools.  In doing so, the Court provided the Czech Republic with 
examples of both appropriate and inappropriate means by which it could affect this 
change.  The opinion expressly forbade the State from integrating the mainstream 
schools whilst continuing to foster segregation by separating students based on racial 
or ethnic status.  The Court made it clear that the respondent would continue to 
violate Article 14 and Article Two of Protocol Number One if it failed to take 




The judgment in DH II differs in several significant ways from the judgments in DH I 
and prior ECHR caselaw, especially in its conception of discrimination.  DH II lays 
out a much more results-focused framework for determining whether discrimination 
has occurred, and places emphasis on the attainment of substantive equality rather 
than mere formal equality.  The decision represents a milestone for minority rights 
and for the jurisprudence of the Court, being the first finding of a violation of Article 
14 of the Convention in relation to a pattern of racial discrimination in public life: in 
this case, public primary schools.69  Although the promise inherent in the judgment 
of equal educational opportunities for Roma children in the Czech Republic remains 
unfulfilled,70 the case nevertheless marks a turning point in the Court’s conception of 
discrimination which will ultimately have flow-on effects through implementation 
and ongoing advocacy.  As Judge Cabral Barreto of the First Chamber aptly stated in 
his dissenting opinion in DH I, the guiding principle of this widened conception of 
discrimination is “all different, all equal”, meaning that Article 14 of the Convention 
covers both negative discrimination and positive discrimination.71  The Court in DH 
II also made it clear that seemingly neutral measures which result in disparate 
outcomes for different groups will be indirectly discriminatory.  Where this is the 
case, the Court stated that it is willing to find violations of Article 14 of the 
Convention, read in conjunction with other Convention articles rather than as 
standalone violations.  The Court also departed from prior ECHR caselaw in its 
                                                        
68 A similar situation arose in Oršuš and Others v Croatia, where although there was no general policy of placing 
Roma children in Roma-only classes, the reality was that Roma children were placed in such classes but not 
provided with any special programme to address language difficulties.  Furthermore, the Government had failed 
to demonstrate how the reduction of the curriculum by 30% would address the applicants’ lack of Croatian 
language proficiency. 
69 Kushen and Gall, op. cit., p. 37. See also paragraph 209 of the DH II judgment. 
70 Kushen and Gall op. cit. p. 37. 






treatment of the applicants as members of a group; its willingness to shift the burden 
of proof in cases of indirect discrimination; its protection of Article 14 from waiver by 
parties; and its approach to the margin of appreciation accorded to States Parties in 
discrimination cases. 
